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As the financial crisis spreads out from its crucible in the U.S. 
and U.K. it has given rise to considerable discussion about its impact 
on developing countries. The situation itself is novel because previous 
international financial crises, the Third World Debt Crisis of the 1980s 
and the emerging market crises of the 1990s, spread from developing 
or emerging markets, so that developing countries were incriminated 
and affected from the start. 
In the present crisis, the developing countries, for once, were not in 
the room when the crisis broke. Given the immense range of economic 
circumstances and exposure to international financial markets among 
the developing countries, the manner in which they are being affected 
is inevitably going to be more complex and indirect than in previous 
crises.
Current economic theory gives little guidance as to how the crisis 
will impact upon the developing countries. This is partly because the 
starting point of mainstream economic theory is optimization based 
on setting policy parameters that will secure internal and external 
equilibrium for a given country. 
It is more realistic to use a stock-flow analysis that places developing 
countries within a given structure of international economic and 
financial flows which are largely determined by expenditures in rich 
countries. Within this framework, assets and liabilities are largely 
determined by the history of past market disequilibria, rather than 
saving or portfolio preferences.
U.S. Government Bond Standard
At the start of the twenty-first century, the international financial system 
is effectively an indirect U.S. Government Bond Standard, in which 
the U.S. dollar acts as a standard of value for all other currencies, and 
is held because it is directly convertible into U.S. Government Bonds 
(Toporowski 2005).  
The nearest alternative international currency, the Euro, cannot take 
over as a reserve currency because a more or less balanced trade 
account does not allow the Euro-zone to supply the rest of the world 
with the amounts of ‘free’ (i.e., unencumbered by borrowing) Euros 
necessary to finance trade. Moreover, the ruling policy doctrine in the 
European Union remains hostile to government bond issues on a scale 
and liquidity that would be necessary to back a global reserve currency. 
A second key feature of the international financial system is the means 
of payment for international transactions. These means are not U.S. 
dollar banknotes, backed by the U.S. Government through the U.S. 
Comptroller of the Currency who signs those banknotes, but
commercial bank credits backed by bank loans to firms and 
governments. (Private individuals do not borrow in any significant 
amounts from international banks). 
Thus international banking has its counterpart in an international debt 
system, mostly in U.S. dollars, whose net debtors are largely smaller and 
poorer countries, because larger and richer countries can finance more 
of their needs with internal debt rather than borrowing from abroad.
Finally, crucial to the current structure of international trade and finance 
is the location in the U.S. of the main markets for the commodity exports 
on which the foreign trade of most developing countries depends. Those 
commodities are therefore priced in U.S. dollars.
Vulnerability of Developing Countries
These features of international finance and trade combine to make 
developing countries extraordinarily vulnerable to the financial crisis 
that is unfolding in the U.S. in particular. As that economy succumbs to 
debt deflation (reduced expenditure in an effort to repay debt), imports 
into the U.S. will be reduced, and with that the supply of ‘free’ dollars to 
the rest of the world. The other industrial countries, which are the main 
suppliers to the U.S., still have large domestic markets and are therefore 
less exposed than developing countries to a fall in their exports. 
For the developing countries, the reduction in their exports to the U.S. 
has been exacerbated by the recent fall in commodity prices (see Figure). 
However, this fall in commodity prices has been to some extent off-set 
by the almost 30% appreciation of the U.S. dollar in foreign exchange 
markets since the crisis started. 
Global Commodity Price Index (2008)
Source: Continuous Commodity Index, CRB Reuters/Jeffries
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This wholly unexpected appreciation has surprised many observers 
still thinking in terms of a foreign exchange market determined by 
rational portfolio calculations of varying degrees of risk-aversion. But 
the appreciation was entirely rational in the context of an indirect U.S. 
Government Bond Standard. 
However, that appreciation has been of little benefit to developing 
countries because they are the principal net debtors in the international 
financial system. Nearly two thirds of all international debt is 
denominated in U.S. dollars and its value has therefore risen along with 
the appreciation of the dollar. 
The U.S. is of course the largest net international debtor in the world. 
But, because the international financial system uses an indirect U.S. 
Government Bond Standard, the U.S. Government can borrow abroad 
in dollars, servicing that borrowing in the same way that it finances its 
domestic debt. 
Foreign currency debt (net of foreign currency reserves) is therefore 
concentrated in developing countries and emerging markets. In this 
situation, monetary policy does not provide any solutions. Depreciation 
of the developing country’s local currency against the dollar, which is 
used to raise the domestic value of exports, increases the domestic cost 
of external debt financing. 
Pegging the local currency to the dollar holds external financing 
costs constant, but leaves the country exposed to reduced U.S. dollar 
commodity export prices. Lowering the cost of foreign currency in local 
currency (i.e., appreciation) reduces export earnings, and encourages 
imports.
The developing countries did well out of the combination of a weak 
dollar and high commodity prices. While weaker commodity prices have 
been to some degree off-set by the appreciation of the U.S. dollar, that 
appreciation has also driven up the value of those countries’ foreign 
debts (relative to the value of their exports), just as exports to the U.S. 
are falling. This is the point at which the crisis puts significant financial 
pressure on poorer countries.
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